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Background
The ability of social insect colonies to tackle different tasks
simultaneously without central control is a key factor in their
ecological success. Individual choices by colony members
give rise to collective behaviours that are robust to dynamic
and uncertain environments (Camazine et al., 2001). The
mechanisms of this process, known as self-organised task
allocation, have inspired a variety of applications in Com-
puter Science, including scheduling (Campos et al., 2000)
and control (Dressler, 2007).
Individual choices in task allocation are determined by
three different interacting factors: individual personalities,
the environment, and interactions amongst colony mem-
bers (Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015). The interplay be-
tween individual traits and the environment has been stud-
ied extensively using models (Bonabeau et al., 1996; Duarte
et al., 2012; Lichocki et al., 2012); but the effect of so-
cial interactions is less well-understood (Jeanson and Wei-
denmu¨ller, 2014; Kao et al., 2014).
We investigate the effects of social interactions in task al-
location using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). We pro-
pose a simple task-allocation game and study how different
learning mechanisms can give rise to specialised and non-
specialised colonies under different ecological conditions.
By combining agent-based simulations and adaptive dynam-
ics we show that social learning can result in colonies of gen-
eralists or specialists, depending on ecological parameters.
Agent-based simulations further show that learning dynam-
ics play a crucial role in task allocation. In particular, intro-
spective individual learning readily favours the emergence
of specialists, while a process resembling task recruitment
favours the emergence of generalists.
A Simple Task-Allocation Game
Our model assumes that individuals live in groups of size n,
and choose to allocate their effort into two different tasks:
Task A is a regulatory task, such as fanning to cool down
nest temperature; Task B is a foraging task, required to sup-
port the energy costs of the colony. The behaviour of in-
dividual i is determined by a continuous trait xi ∈ [0, 1],
the probability that individual i will perform Task A. Thus,
1− xi is the probability of individual i engaging in Task B.
In the most general sense, the payoff of individual i is given
by: Π(xi) = B(xi) − C(xi), where B(xi) and C(xi) are
benefits and cost respectively. Total payoff for one individ-
ual depends not only on her own trait, but also on the traits
of all others in the population.
We define the benefit function as B(xi) = BA(xi) ·
BB(xi). This implies that the benefits of foraging are dis-
counted if the colony is not well-regulated. For the regula-
tory task, we assume that benefits are maximised when an
intermediate number of individuals are engaged in regula-
tion, thus BA(xi) is a concave function in
∑n
j=0 xj . For
the foraging task we assume that individual benefits increase
linearly with collective foraging effort.
To fix ideas BA(xi) is assumed to be quadratic with max-
imum value 1 when half of the workers in the group are en-
gaged in Task A. Likewise, b is the individual reward from
performing Task B in one time period. Thus,
BA(xi) = − 4
n2
· (
n∑
j=1
xj)
2 +
4
n
·
n∑
j=1
xj
and
BB(xi) =
1
n
· b
( n∑
j=1
(1− xj)
)
.
For this payoff structure the rewards of foraging are main-
tained in full, only when regulation is optimal.
Costs are defined as C(xi) = CA(xi) + CB(xi). The
cost of regulation is assumed to be linear, with CA(xi) =
r · xi. Here, r represents the cost of performing Task A
for an individual in one time period. The nature of foraging
implies decreasing marginal costs, thus CB(xi) = −(1 −
xi)
2 + 2(1− xi) for xi ∈ [0, 1].
Social learning
How do individuals in the colony learn to coordinate their
efforts to successfully perform both tasks? We obtain a
first approximation by using the mathematical framework of
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adaptive dynamics (Bra¨nnstro¨m et al., 2013). The underly-
ing process resembles social learning, whereby individuals
tend to copy those that are most successful. The assump-
tions of adaptive dynamics imply a very large population
where mutations are rare and small (Waxman and Gavrilets,
2005).
The analysis predicts a unique singular strategy x∗ that
is convergent stable. We derive conditions for evolutionary
branching; a situation in which a monomorphous popula-
tion splits in two morphs (Doebeli et al., 2004). In the con-
text of task allocation, this implies that the colony success-
fully tends to both tasks, but each individual specializes by
putting all their effort into one single task. Alternatively, the
colony can converge to a state in which generalists share re-
sponsibilities and each individual splits efforts in both tasks.
We refer to the latter as weak specialisation, as opposed
to strong specialisation in the former case. Given x∗, the
colony exhibits strong specialisation if
8b
n2
(3x∗ − 2) + 2 > 0
or weak specialisation (evolutionary stable strategy) if
8b
n2
(3x∗ − 2) + 2 < 0.
The system can also converge to a state in which the colony
fails to coordinate its efforts in both tasks. In this case we
speak of an inviable colony.
Figure 1 shows how these different outcomes depend on
ecological conditions as given by the values of b and r.
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Figure 1: Classification of colony behaviour as predicted
by adaptive dynamics
Figure 2: Agent-based simulations for social learning
To check the robustness of our mathematical prediction
we use an agent-based simulation. Social learning follows
a Wright-Fisher process where the population is not neces-
sarily monomorphous (Imhof and Nowak, 2006). This is
similar to roulette wheel selection in a standard Genetic Al-
gorithm (Fogel, 2006).
Figure 2 shows that our simulation results are in line with
the predictions from adaptive dynamics. Our results indicate
that when foraging is expensive, agents fail to coordinate
and the colony is not viable. For intermediate costs of for-
aging individuals strongly specialize, while cheap foraging
leads to a population of generalists.
Other Learning Mechanisms
The mathematical framework and the simulations so far as-
sume that agents learn socially. This implies that individuals
can observe the traits of all others in the colony, while at the
same time inferring how successful a particular trait is. We
perform simulations in which this assumption is relaxed in
two different ways: i) A model of individual learning as-
sumes that agents learn exclusively from their own experi-
ence. ii) A model of task recruitment assumes that agents
respond to recruitment signals for either task.
Individual Learning
For individual learning we assume that agents remember
their most recent strategy and its associated payoff. Inno-
vations arise via exploration with a small probability. If a
new strategy is not better than the most recent one, individ-
uals roll back to their previous strategy. This class of intro-
spective learning is thought to be less cognitively demanding
than social learning.
Figure 3: Classification of colonies based on the model of
individual reinforcement
Figure 3 shows the simulation results for this model. Indi-
vidual learning readily favours strong specialisation across a
large range of parameters.
Task Recruitment
We also investigate a process of task recruitment, inspired by
the ecological literature on task allocation (Dukas, 2008). In
this version of the model, agents respond to recruitment sig-
nals for each task. At each time-step, individuals choose a
single task to perform based on their trait, i.e., individual i
chooses Task A with probability xi. In a recruitment phase,
individuals modify their trait according recruitment signals
send by successful individuals in the population. In particu-
lar, we assume that the intensity of the signal is proportional
to the fitness of the recruiter.
Figure 4: Classification of colonies based on the model of
task recruitment
The simulation results for this model are shown in Fig-
ure 4. Task recruitment favours weak specialisation across a
large range of parameters.
Discussion
This paper shows that EGT is a promising avenue to study
the effect of social interactions in task allocation models.
In particular, we show that a simple model of social learn-
ing can give insights into when to expect different levels of
specialization. We show that the mechanism by which in-
dividuals learn can dramatically change predictions: while
social learning is conducive to societies of specialists and
generalists, individual learning readily leads to strong spe-
cialization.
More research is needed to understand how different
species may rely on different kinds of learning. Our models
suggest that the ecology of the tasks interacts in a non-trivial
way with the cognitive capacities of the species.
Extensions of this model can introduce different types of
tasks as well as the option of performing no tasks, which
has been widely observed in social insect colonies. Further
research is also needed to provide analytic predictions for
individual learning, and to understand how different time-
scales of learning and ecology may interact with each other
in task allocation games.
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